Can a Board Resolution Alone Wind Down a Company and Sell All Its Assets? What Shareholders Must Approve

No. A board resolution to sell all assets of a company and wind it down is three different decisions wearing one label, and the directors can lawfully take only the first of them on their own. Stopping or suspending the business is a management decision that sits with the Board under Section 179 of the Companies Act, 2013. Selling, leasing or otherwise disposing of the whole or substantially the whole of the undertaking needs the consent of the members by special resolution under Section 180(1)(a), unless the company is a private company entitled to the 2015 exemption. Liquidating the company itself needs a special resolution as well, whether the route is voluntary liquidation under Section 59 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, winding up by the Tribunal under Section 271, or strike-off under Section 248. A special resolution passes only if the votes in favour are at least three times the votes against under Section 114(2), so a shareholder holding just over a quarter of the votes actually cast can defeat it, but only by attending and voting against.

Part of the corporate and commercial law practice at S Jain & Attorneys, Bangalore.

This guide is written for a shareholder, usually a minority shareholder, who has received a board resolution or a circular saying that the company will "wind down operations and liquidate its assets", and who wants to know what two or three directors can do alone, what needs the members, what a holder of more than 25 percent can block, and what to do this week. It deals with unlisted companies under the Companies Act, 2013 and the Code. It does not cover listed-company takeover or delisting rules, employee dues on closure, or the tax treatment of the sale.

What does a "wind down and liquidate" board resolution actually contain?

It contains three separate acts, and each has its own approval regime. The first is ceasing or suspending business operations: telling customers, stopping production, letting contracts run off. The second is disposing of the undertaking: selling the plant, the stock, the intellectual property, the customer contracts, or the business as a going concern. The third is ending the company's legal existence: voluntary liquidation, winding up by the Tribunal, or having the name struck off the register. Boards write all three into one paragraph because that is how they think about the exit. The Act does not read it that way.

The distinction matters for two reasons. It tells you which parts of the resolution are lawful as they stand and which parts are, at most, a statement of intention that the directors cannot carry out without you. And it tells you where the deadlines fall. A board decision to stop trading takes effect when it is passed. A sale of the undertaking cannot lawfully complete until a general meeting has been called on proper notice and a special resolution passed. A liquidation cannot commence until the members have resolved to liquidate. Everything a minority shareholder can do sits inside those windows, so the rest of this guide takes the three acts in turn and then deals with the arithmetic of the vote, the meeting rules, the filings that prove what happened, and the remedies.

Can directors stop the business by a board resolution alone?

Yes, as a matter of company law, and this is the part of the resolution that is usually valid. Section 179(1) entitles the Board to exercise all the powers the company itself may exercise, subject to the Act, the memorandum, the articles and any regulations the company makes in general meeting, and it bars the Board from doing anything the Act or the articles reserve to the members. Nothing in the Act reserves a decision to suspend trading to the general meeting, so on its own it is a Board matter. Section 179(3) lists the powers that must be exercised by resolution at a Board meeting rather than by circulation, and they include borrowing, investing the company's funds, approving the financial statements and diversifying the business. A resolution to cease operations belongs in that category of formal Board business, so ask for the minutes and the attendance.

Two qualifications follow. First, the articles and any shareholders' agreement may reserve a decision to cease business to the members or to a named investor, and Section 179(1) makes the Board's powers subject to the articles. Read both documents before conceding the point. Second, the power is not unconditioned. Section 166 requires every director to act in good faith to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, to exercise due and reasonable care, skill and diligence, to exercise independent judgment, to avoid any situation in which his interest conflicts or may conflict with the company's, and not to achieve any undue gain for himself, his relatives, partners or associates. Section 166(5) makes a director who makes an undue gain liable to pay an amount equal to that gain to the company, and Section 166(7) adds a fine. A decision to shut a viable business in order to squeeze out a minority holder, or to clear the way for the assets to move to a director's other venture, is a breach of duty even if the Board meeting was procedurally perfect. The point to hold onto is practical: a company that has stopped trading is a company whose assets are next, and it is the sale, not the stoppage, that the Act puts in the members' hands.

Key takeaway. The Board can decide to stop trading. It cannot, by itself, decide to sell the business or to end the company. Each of those needs a special resolution of the members, which means a general meeting on clear twenty-one days' notice, a vote you are entitled to attend, and a filing with the Registrar within thirty days that you can check.

When does a board resolution to sell all assets of a company need a special resolution under Section 180?

Whenever the sale, lease or other disposal covers the whole or substantially the whole of the company's undertaking, or of any one of its undertakings where it has more than one. Section 180(1)(a) provides that the Board shall exercise that power only with the consent of the company by a special resolution, and the Explanation supplies the numbers. An "undertaking" is one in which the company's investment exceeds twenty percent of its net worth as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year, or one which generated twenty percent of the company's total income in the previous financial year. "Substantially the whole of the undertaking" means twenty percent or more of the value of the undertaking as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year.

Read those two tests together and the reach of the section becomes clear. A company that runs a single business has a single undertaking, and a disposal of twenty percent or more of its value by the last audited balance sheet is caught. The words "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of" are deliberately wide, so a slump sale, a business transfer agreement, a long lease of the premises and plant, or a transfer of the customer contracts and intellectual property that leaves an empty shell behind are all within the clause. So is a series of smaller disposals that together strip out the business, because the section looks at the undertaking, not at each invoice. Section 180(4) adds that the special resolution may impose conditions, including conditions on the use, disposal or investment of the sale proceeds, which means the members and not the Board decide whether the money is distributed, reinvested or left with the company. For completeness, Section 180(1)(c) requires the same special resolution before the company borrows beyond the aggregate of its paid-up capital and free reserves, which is often the next step a Board takes when it wants to fund an exit without selling. Section 117(3)(e) requires every resolution consenting to the exercise of the Section 180(1)(a) or (c) power to be filed with the Registrar, which is how the outside world learns that it was passed.

The three acts, and who decides each, look like this.

What if the assets have already been sold: Section 180(3) and the buyer in good faith

Once the sale has completed, a buyer who bought in good faith keeps the asset. Section 180(3)(a) provides that nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) affects the title of a buyer or other person who buys or takes on lease any property, investment or undertaking in good faith, and Section 180(3)(b) excludes sales made in the ordinary course of a business that consists of selling or leasing such property. The consequence for a shareholder is that the remedy for a sale without a special resolution lies against the directors and must be pursued before completion. After completion the shareholder is left with claims: disgorgement of any undue gain under Section 166(5), relief against the directors under Sections 241 and 242, damages under Section 245(1)(g), and the record of a Section 117 default. None of those unwinds a bona fide buyer's title.

Good faith is the buyer's shield, and it is the shareholder's opening. A buyer who has been told in writing, before completion, that no special resolution exists and that the shareholder objects will struggle to claim that it completed in good faith. That is why one of the steps below is a letter to the buyer, sent early and kept. It costs nothing, it changes the buyer's position, and it turns a fait accompli into a transaction the buyer's own lawyers will not let close without the resolution.

Deadline warning. Section 180(3) protects a buyer who completes in good faith, so a shareholder who waits for the sale deed to be registered has usually waited too long. The working deadlines are the twenty-one clear days of notice before the general meeting under Section 101 and the thirty days after the meeting within which a special resolution must be filed with the Registrar under Section 117. Act inside them.

Does Section 180 apply to a private limited company?

Often it does not, and this is the first thing to check. By a notification dated 5 June 2015 issued under Section 462 of the Act, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs directed that Section 180 shall not apply to a private company. A compliant private company's Board can therefore sell the undertaking without a special resolution as a matter of statute. The exemption is not unconditional. By a further notification dated 13 June 2017 the Ministry made the exceptions and modifications in the 2015 notification applicable only to a private company which has not committed a default in filing its financial statements under Section 137 or its annual return under Section 92 with the Registrar. A private company that is behind on either filing loses the exemption, and Section 180 applies to it in full. Section 137 requires the adopted financial statements to be filed within thirty days of the annual general meeting, and Section 92 requires the annual return within sixty days of it, so the default question is answered by the company's own filing history on the Ministry's portal.

Three further points keep the exemption narrower than boards assume. A private company that is a subsidiary of a public company is deemed to be a public company for the purposes of the Act by the proviso to Section 2(71), even if its articles still call it private, so no exemption applies to it. The articles and the shareholders' agreement of a private company very often contain their own reserved-matters clause requiring member or investor consent to a sale of the business, and Section 179(1) makes the Board's powers subject to the articles, so a contractual consent right survives the statutory exemption. And the 2015 notification is an instrument under the Companies Act. It does not touch Section 59 of the Code or Section 271 of the Act, so even in a fully compliant private company the directors cannot liquidate the company or petition for its winding up without a special resolution of the members. The exemption reaches the sale, not the exit.

Who approves liquidating the company itself under Section 59 of the IBC?

The members do, by special resolution, and the creditors do as well if the company owes any debt. Section 59(1) allows a corporate person that has not committed any default to initiate voluntary liquidation. Section 59(3) sets the conditions for a company. First, a declaration from a majority of the directors, verified by affidavit, that they have made a full inquiry into the affairs of the company and have formed the opinion that it has no debt or will be able to pay its debts in full from the proceeds of the assets to be sold in the liquidation, and that the company is not being liquidated to defraud any person. Second, the declaration must be accompanied by the audited financial statements and record of business operations for the previous two years, or since incorporation if later, and by a valuation report on the assets prepared by a registered valuer, if any. Third, within four weeks of the declaration there must be a special resolution of the members in general meeting requiring the company to be liquidated voluntarily and appointing an insolvency professional as liquidator. The proviso adds that where the company owes any debt, creditors representing two-thirds in value of the debt must approve the resolution within seven days of its passing.

Section 59(4) requires the company to notify the Registrar and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India within seven days of the resolution or of the creditors' approval, and Section 59(5) fixes the commencement of the liquidation at the date of the members' resolution, subject to the creditors' approval. When the affairs are fully wound up and the assets liquidated, Section 59(7) and (8) have the liquidator apply to the Adjudicating Authority, which orders the dissolution of the company. The detailed process is in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Voluntary Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2017. Regulation 3 carries the directors' declaration, and by the amendment notified on 31 January 2024 the declaration must also disclose pending proceedings and litigation and state that sufficient provision has been made for them, and a liquidator whose process overruns must hold meetings of the contributories and file status reports. For the shareholder, the shape of the section is the message. The declaration of solvency belongs to the directors alone. The decision to liquidate belongs to the members, on a special resolution, at a general meeting called on notice, within a four-week window that starts on the date of the declaration. If the company cannot pay its debts in full, the route is not available at all, and a declaration that says otherwise is a sworn statement that the directors will have to defend.

What about winding up by the Tribunal, or strike-off under Section 248?

Both need the members too. Section 271 lists the circumstances in which the Tribunal may wind a company up on a petition under Section 272, and one of them is that the company has, by special resolution, resolved that it be wound up by the Tribunal. Another is that the Tribunal considers it just and equitable to wind the company up. Section 272 lists who may present the petition: the company itself, a contributory, the Registrar, and a person authorised by the Central Government, and it requires a petition presented by the company to be accompanied by a statement of affairs. A Board therefore cannot present a winding-up petition in the company's name on its own authority. A contributory, which includes a shareholder, can present one, subject to the holding period Section 272 prescribes for shares that were not originally allotted to him, which makes the just and equitable ground a sword in the minority holder's hands as well as a shield.

Strike-off is the third exit and the one boards reach for because it looks administrative. Section 248(2) allows a company, after extinguishing all its liabilities, to apply to the Registrar to have its name removed from the register, but only by a special resolution or with the consent of seventy-five percent of the members in terms of paid-up share capital. The application, the Registrar's public notice and the dissolution that follows are covered in the firm's guide to striking off a company in India, so this guide does not repeat them. The single point for present purposes is that seventy-five percent of the paid-up capital is a threshold a holder of more than twenty-five percent can deny by refusing to consent, and a special resolution is one the same holder can defeat by voting against.

How many votes does a special resolution need under Section 114?

Votes in favour of at least three times the votes against, counted among the members who are entitled to vote and who actually vote. Section 114(2) sets three conditions. The intention to propose the resolution as a special resolution must have been specified in the notice calling the meeting, the notice required by the Act must have been duly given, and the votes cast in favour, whether on a show of hands, electronically or on a poll, by members voting in person, by proxy or by postal ballot, must be not less than three times the votes cast against by members so entitled and voting. An ordinary resolution under Section 114(1), by contrast, passes on a bare majority of the votes cast.

The arithmetic is where minority holders win or lose. Take one hundred votes cast. Seventy-five in favour and twenty-five against passes, because seventy-five is exactly three times twenty-five. Seventy-four in favour and twenty-six against fails. So a member who controls just over twenty-five percent of the votes cast can block a special resolution, but the denominator is votes cast, not shares held, and that cuts both ways. A member with thirty percent of the shares who attends and votes against turns a seventy-to-thirty result into a failed resolution, because seventy is less than ninety. The same member who abstains, or who stays away, leaves seventy votes in favour and none against, and the resolution passes. Abstention shrinks the denominator and hands the Board its majority. Equally, a member with twenty percent can block if enough of the majority stays home: twenty votes against need sixty in favour, and if only fifty-five percent of the shares are voted in favour the resolution fails. The percentage that matters is of the votes in the room, on the day.

Two mechanics decide whether your votes are counted by shareholding at all. A show of hands does not weigh votes by the number of shares held, so a member whose strength lies in shares rather than in numbers must have a poll. Section 109 obliges the chairman to order a poll on a demand made, before or on the declaration of the result on a show of hands, by members present in person or by proxy holding not less than one-tenth of the total voting power, or shares on which not less than five lakh rupees has been paid up, and Section 109(7) makes the result of the poll the decision of the meeting. And a proxy cannot vote except on a poll, under the proviso to Section 105(1). A minority holder who sends a proxy and does not demand a poll may find that the proxy sat silent while the show of hands went the other way.

Common mistake. Staying away from the meeting in protest, or sending a proxy without demanding a poll. An absent member shrinks the denominator and a proxy cannot vote on a show of hands, so both hand the Board a majority it might not otherwise have had. The only vote that blocks a special resolution is a vote cast against it.

What notice, quorum and proxy rules protect a minority shareholder?

The rules in Sections 100 to 109 of the Act, and each one is a lever. Section 101(1) requires a general meeting to be called on not less than clear twenty-one days' notice, in writing or by electronic mode, and Section 101(2) requires the notice to state the place, date, day and hour of the meeting and the business to be transacted. Shorter notice is possible only with the consent of members representing not less than ninety-five percent of those entitled to vote, so a holder of more than five percent can refuse it, and should. Section 101(3) requires the notice to go to every member, to the auditor and to every director, and Section 101(4) provides that an accidental omission to give notice, or its non-receipt, does not invalidate the meeting. That last provision is why a member who was not sent notice should say so in writing at once and demand the dispatch record, rather than assume the meeting is void.

Section 102 requires a statement to be annexed to the notice setting out the material facts concerning each item of special business, including the nature and extent of the interest of every director, key managerial person and their relatives in the item, and any other information that enables members to understand its meaning, scope and implications. At an extraordinary general meeting every item is special business under Section 102(2)(b). Where the item refers to a document, Section 102(3) requires the statement to say where and when the document can be inspected, so a resolution approving a sale should point you to the sale agreement and the valuation, and a shareholder is entitled to ask for both. Section 102(4) makes any benefit a promoter, director or key managerial person derives from non-disclosure or insufficient disclosure a benefit held in trust for the company.

Section 103(1)(b) fixes the quorum for a private company at two members personally present unless the articles require more, and Section 103(2) and (3) provide that a meeting without a quorum stands adjourned to the same day in the next week, and that at the adjourned meeting the members present are the quorum. Boycotting the meeting therefore does not defeat it. Section 105 entitles a member to appoint a proxy, who need not be a member, who cannot speak, and who can vote only on a poll, and it limits the deposit period the articles may require to forty-eight hours before the meeting. Section 100(2) allows members holding one-tenth of the paid-up capital carrying voting rights to requisition an extraordinary general meeting, which the Board must call within twenty-one days for a date not later than forty-five days after the requisition, failing which the requisitionists may call it themselves within three months. That is the route by which a minority holder puts the directors' conduct on the agenda instead of waiting for theirs.

How do you find out whether a special resolution was ever passed?

From the Registrar's record, which the company must update within thirty days. Section 117(1) requires a copy of every resolution to which the section applies, together with the explanatory statement under Section 102 annexed to the notice of the meeting, to be filed with the Registrar within thirty days of its passing. Section 117(3)(a) applies the section to every special resolution, and Section 117(3)(e) applies it separately to any resolution by which the members consent to the Board exercising the powers under Section 180(1)(a) or (c). The prescribed form is e-form MGT-14 under the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014, and a company that fails to file it, and every officer in default, is liable to a penalty. Section 399 entitles any person to inspect the documents kept by the Registrar by electronic means on payment of the prescribed fee, which in practice means a search of the company's filings on the Ministry's portal.

The absence of an MGT-14 within thirty days of the date on which the Board says the meeting was held tells you one of two things: no special resolution was passed, or the company is in default of Section 117. Either is evidence. Alongside the portal, Section 94(2) gives every member the right to inspect the registers and the copies of the annual returns at the registered office during business hours without payment of any fee, Section 94(3) allows extracts to be taken free and copies to be demanded on payment, and Section 94(4) imposes a penalty on the company and every officer in default for each day a refusal continues. Write to the company asking for the notice of the meeting, the explanatory statement, the minutes, the poll scrutiniser's report if a poll was taken, and the MGT-14 acknowledgment. The reply, or the silence, goes into the petition.

Can the NCLT stop the sale? Sections 241, 242(4) and the Section 244 threshold

Yes, on an interim application in an oppression petition. Section 241(1)(a) allows any member to apply to the Tribunal on the ground that the company's affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudicial or oppressive to him or to any other member, or prejudicial to the interests of the company. A sale of the whole undertaking without the special resolution the Act requires, or to a party connected with a director at an undervalue, is a recognised pattern of that kind. Section 242(4) empowers the Tribunal, on the application of any party to the proceeding, to make any interim order it thinks fit for regulating the conduct of the company's affairs on such terms as appear to it just and equitable, and that is the provision under which a sale is restrained pending the hearing. Final relief under Section 242(2) includes the regulation of the company's affairs in future, the purchase of a member's shares by other members or by the company, the setting aside of agreements between the company and third parties after notice to them, the setting aside of transfers made within three months before the application that would be fraudulent preferences, the removal of directors, and the recovery of undue gains made by them.

Eligibility is governed by Section 244(1)(a): not less than one hundred members or one-tenth of the total number of members, whichever is less, or any member or members holding not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital, provided all calls on their shares have been paid, with a proviso allowing the Tribunal to waive the requirement. A holder of more than twenty-five percent clears the threshold comfortably. How oppression is established, what the Tribunal orders, and how an exit at fair value is valued are dealt with in the firm's guides to oppression and mismanagement under Sections 241 and 242 and to share valuation in NCLT buy-out orders, and this guide does not repeat them. The point that belongs here is timing. The interim application must be on file before the sale completes, because after completion Section 180(3) has already protected the buyer and the Tribunal is left ordering a buy-out or damages rather than preserving the business.

Is a class action under Section 245 an option?

It is, for a group of members, and it is aimed at exactly the resolution described in this guide. Section 245(1) allows the requisite number of members to apply to the Tribunal on the ground that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company or its members, for orders restraining the company from acting outside its memorandum or articles, declaring void a resolution passed by suppression of material facts or obtained by misstatement to the members, restraining the company and its directors from acting on such a resolution, restraining the company from doing an act contrary to the Act, and claiming damages or compensation from the company or its directors for any fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act. A special resolution obtained on an explanatory statement that hid the buyer's connection to a director, or the true value of the undertaking, is the paradigm case for Section 245(1)(c) and (d). The requisite number of members is fixed by the rules made under the section, and the Section 241 route remains the one used far more often, because a single member who meets the Section 244 threshold can bring it and because Section 242(4) gives immediate interim protection. Which to use is a question of numbers and of what you want at the end: a restored resolution and damages, or an exit and a price.

Can a civil court injunct a sale made in breach of Section 180?

In principle, and it is the natural route for a person who is not a member, or where the company is a private company exempt from Section 180 but bound by a reserved-matters clause in its articles or a shareholders' agreement, which is a contractual right rather than a company-law one. For a member complaining about the company's own conduct the Tribunal is usually the better forum, because the same facts make out a case under Section 241 and because Section 242(4) is designed for interim protection of the company's affairs. Whatever the forum, three things are constant. The application must precede completion because of Section 180(3). The directors who sell without the resolution the Act requires face disgorgement under Section 166(5) and the record of a Section 117 default, so the claim against them survives the sale even if the asset does not come back. And the letter to the buyer, sent before completion and naming the missing resolution, is the cheapest injunction there is, because a buyer who completes with knowledge is no longer a buyer in good faith.

Four facts decide most of these disputes, and each is already in this guide.

What should a minority shareholder do this week?

1. Attend every general meeting, in person if you can, and vote against. Do not abstain and do not stay away in protest, because Section 114(2) counts only the votes cast and Section 103 lets an adjourned meeting proceed with whoever is present.
2. Write to the company asking for the notice of any meeting, the explanatory statement under Section 102, the valuation report and the draft sale agreement the statement should have pointed you to, the Board minutes recording the decision to cease business, and the MGT-14 acknowledgment for any special resolution the Board says was passed.
3. Search the company's filings on the Ministry's portal under Section 399. Look for an MGT-14 within thirty days of the claimed meeting and for the status of the last financial statements under Section 137 and annual return under Section 92. If the company is a private company, that filing history decides whether the 2015 exemption from Section 180 is available to it at all.
4. Read the articles and any shareholders' agreement for reserved matters. A contractual consent right to a sale of the business or a cessation of operations survives the statutory exemption and binds the Board through Section 179(1).
5. If you cannot attend, appoint a proxy within the forty-eight hour deposit window under Section 105, and instruct the proxy in writing to demand a poll under Section 109 before or on the declaration of the result. Refuse in writing any request for consent to shorter notice under Section 101.
6. Put the proposed buyer on written notice, before completion, that no special resolution under Section 180(1)(a) has been passed and that you object. Keep the proof of delivery. This is what turns a buyer in good faith into a buyer with notice.
7. Preserve the paper: the board resolution you received, the covering email, the register of members, prior annual returns, bank statements showing where the money went, and any messages in which the directors discussed the plan. A Section 241 petition is decided on documents.
8. Sign nothing. Not a consent to shorter notice, not a resolution by circulation, not a waiver, not a no-objection to the buyer, not an acknowledgment of the directors' declaration of solvency under Section 59.
9. Take advice on a Section 241 petition with an interim application under Section 242(4), and file it before the sale completes. The Tribunal can preserve the business. Once the asset has changed hands to a bona fide buyer, it can only price your exit.

A practitioner's note

In practice the argument is rarely about whether the law requires a special resolution. Boards that circulate a "wind down and liquidate" resolution usually know that it does, and the resolution is drafted to read as if the decision has already been made so that the minority holder treats it as one. The argument is about time, and about who is watching the post. A shareholder who reads the board resolution as the decision, and stops watching for the notice of the general meeting, discovers the sale from the annual return a year later, by which time Section 180(3) has settled the buyer's title and the only questions left are the price of a buy-out and the size of a claim against the directors. A shareholder who reads the board resolution as an announcement, asks for the explanatory statement, checks the portal for the MGT-14, writes to the buyer and turns up to vote against, usually finds that the sale does not complete on the Board's timetable, and that the conversation about an exit at fair value begins from a very different place. The Act gives the minority holder a set of small, cheap, time-bound rights. They only work if they are used inside the window.

Frequently Asked Questions

This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice on your specific situation.

Related Guides

For advice on shareholder approvals, minority protection and disputes over the sale of a business, see our corporate and commercial law practice.

• Oppression and Mismanagement under Sections 241-242: Minority Shareholder Remedies at NCLT
• Shareholder Disputes in Private Limited Companies: Legal Remedies and Prevention
• Share Valuation in NCLT Buy-Out Orders: How Fair Value Is Fixed When a Minority Shareholder Exits
• Related Party Transactions Under Section 188: Approvals and Risk
• Director Disqualification Under Section 164: Causes and Cure
• How to Strike Off a Company in India: STK-2 Guide
• Insolvency Threshold Under IBC: The Rs 1 Crore Minimum Default