A tag-along right lets a minority shareholder join a sale on the same terms the majority negotiated for itself. A drag-along right lets the majority compel the minority to sell into an offer for the whole company. On drag along, tag along, India settled the enforceability question over a decade ago: a SEBI notification dated 3 October 2013 expressly permits contracts for pre-emption, right of first refusal, tag-along and drag-along rights in shareholders agreements and articles of association, and the proviso to Section 58(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 makes a contract between shareholders in respect of transfer of securities enforceable as a contract. What still fails, regularly, is the drafting.
Drag along, tag along, India: where these rights come from
Three sources do the work.
The first is the Companies Act, 2013. Section 2(68) requires a private company's articles to restrict the right to transfer its shares, which is the hook on which pre-emption and transfer-restriction machinery hangs. Section 58(2) declares that securities of a public company shall be freely transferable, but its proviso adds that any contract or arrangement between two or more persons in respect of transfer of securities shall be enforceable as a contract. That proviso ended a long argument about whether shareholder-level transfer restrictions in a public company were void.
The second is securities regulation. SEBI Notification No. LAD-NRO/GN/2013-14/26/6667 dated 3 October 2013, issued under Sections 16 and 28 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, lists the categories of share purchase and sale contracts a person may enter into. Clause (c) covers contracts for pre-emption including right of first refusal, or tag-along or drag-along rights, contained in shareholders agreements or articles of association. Clause (d) covers put and call options in such documents, subject to the seller holding the underlying securities continuously for at least one year, the price complying with applicable law, and settlement by actual delivery. A proviso requires all these contracts to comply with the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.
The third is case law. In V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan, decided on 28 November 1991 and reported at AIR 1992 SC 453, the Supreme Court held that a restriction on transfer agreed among shareholders but not reflected in the articles was binding neither on the company nor on the shareholders. In Messer Holdings Limited v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, decided on 1 September 2010, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court declined to follow the single judge view in Western Maharashtra Development Corporation Ltd v. Bajaj Auto Ltd, reported at (2010) 154 Company Cases 593 (Bom), reasoning that a pre-emption arrangement freely entered into by a shareholder in respect of his own shares is an exercise of the right of transferability rather than a restriction on it.
Those three sources come down to four provisions, and together they explain why the articles matter as much as the agreement.
Section 2(68), Companies Act
A private company's articles must restrict the right to transfer its shares. That is the hook on which pre-emption and transfer-restriction machinery hangs.
Proviso to Section 58(2)
Public company securities are freely transferable, but a contract between two or more persons in respect of transfer of securities is enforceable as a contract.
SEBI notification, 3 October 2013
Clause (c) permits contracts for pre-emption including right of first refusal, or tag-along or drag-along rights, in shareholders agreements or articles of association.
V.B. Rangaraj, 1991
A restriction on transfer agreed among shareholders but not reflected in the articles was held binding neither on the company nor on the shareholders.
Key takeaway. The right exists in the shareholders agreement. The enforceability against the company, and against a transferee who was never a party, comes from putting the same clause in the articles of association. Agreements that were never mirrored in the articles are where most disputes start.
What each right actually does
| Right | Who it protects | What it compels | Typical trigger |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right of first refusal | Continuing shareholders | The seller must offer the shares to them on the same terms a third party has offered | Receipt of a bona fide third party offer |
| Right of first offer | The selling shareholder, in practice | The seller must invite an offer from the others before going to the market | A decision to sell, before any third party is approached |
| Tag-along | Minority and investors | The buyer must also buy the tagging shareholder's shares on the same terms | A sale by the promoter or majority above a stated threshold |
| Drag-along | Majority and lead investors | The minority must sell into the same transaction on the same terms | An offer for a stated percentage, often 100 per cent, above a floor price |
| Statutory squeeze-out under Section 236 | An acquirer holding ninety per cent or more | An offer to buy out the remaining equity at a registered valuer's price | Crossing ninety per cent of issued equity share capital |
Note the last row. Section 236 of the Companies Act, 2013 is not a contractual drag. It is a statutory mechanism that comes alive once an acquirer, or persons acting in concert, hold ninety per cent or more of the issued equity share capital, requiring notification to the company and an offer to the minority at a price determined by a registered valuer, with the consideration deposited in a separate bank account operated by the company for at least a year. It is a fallback where the contractual drag is missing or defective, and it is slower.
How a drag actually runs
- The dragging shareholders receive a binding offer from a buyer that satisfies the contractual conditions: the stated percentage, the price floor, and the permitted form of consideration.
- A drag notice is issued to every dragged shareholder in the manner the agreement prescribes, setting out the buyer, the price per share, the closing date and the documents to be signed.
- The dragged shareholders are called on to execute the share purchase agreement, or the power of attorney or deed of adherence the agreement contemplates, within the notice period.
- Board and shareholder approvals are taken, waivers of pre-emption and any right of first refusal are recorded, and any consent required from lenders or under a licence is obtained.
- Conditions precedent are satisfied, the transfer forms are executed and stamped, and for dematerialised shares the depository instructions are given.
- Consideration is paid, escrow and indemnity arrangements are put in place, and the register of members is updated and the statutory filings made.
- If a dragged shareholder refuses to sign, the transaction proceeds on the enforcement mechanic in the agreement, usually a power of attorney in favour of a nominee or a deemed transfer provision recorded in the articles.
Common mistake. Relying on a specific performance suit as the enforcement route for a drag. Litigation timelines destroy deals. The mechanic that works is a self-executing one built into the articles and supported by an irrevocable power of attorney signed at the time of investment, not a clause that merely says the minority "shall sell".
The clauses that decide whether the drag is fair
A drag-along clause is a transfer of decision-making power over someone else's property. Courts and tribunals look at whether the bargain was fairly struck, and Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 give a squeezed minority a forum to complain of oppression. The clauses that keep a drag defensible are these.
A threshold that means something. A drag triggered by holders of fifty-one per cent is very different from one requiring seventy-five per cent plus the investor majority. State the percentage of share capital, not of the board.
A price floor. Many Indian agreements provide that a drag cannot be exercised below a stated valuation, or below the price at which the last funding round was done, or below a floor determined by a registered valuer. Without a floor, the clause invites the argument that the majority sold cheap for a side benefit.
Genuine parity of terms. The dragged shareholder should receive the same price per share, the same form of consideration, and the same payment timing. Where the majority takes cash and the minority is handed unlisted buyer stock, parity has failed.
Proportionate liability. The dragged shareholder should give warranties only as to title, capacity and authority, not full business warranties, and its liability should be capped at its share of the consideration. Uncapped joint and several indemnities for a two per cent holder are the single most contested item in Indian drag negotiations.
Exclusions and carve-outs. Intra-group transfers, transfers to affiliates, and transfers on death or by operation of law are normally carved out of both drag and tag. Founders often negotiate that a drag cannot be exercised against them within a defined lock-in.
These are the four terms that keep a drag defensible when a squeezed minority complains.
A meaningful threshold
State the percentage of share capital, not of the board. A drag triggered at fifty-one per cent is very different from one needing seventy-five per cent.
A price floor
A drag cannot be exercised below a stated valuation, the last round price, or a floor set by a registered valuer. Without one, the majority can sell cheap.
Genuine parity of terms
Same price per share, same form of consideration, same payment timing. Where the majority takes cash and the minority takes unlisted buyer stock, parity has failed.
Proportionate liability
Warranties only as to title, capacity and authority, with liability capped at the dragged shareholder's share of the consideration, not full business warranties.
Regulatory overlays that change the analysis
Foreign investors. The SEBI notification's proviso requires these contracts to comply with the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. In practice that means an exit for a non-resident cannot be structured as an assured return, and the pricing rules under the exchange control framework apply on the way out as much as on the way in. A drag or tag that guarantees a fixed internal rate of return to an offshore investor tends to be redrafted the moment counsel reads it.
Listed companies. For a company whose shares are listed, a change of control triggers the open offer obligations under the SEBI takeover regulations, which achieve much of what a tag-along does contractually. Drag rights are, in practical terms, a private and unlisted company device.
Refusal to register. If the company refuses to register a transfer, Section 58 gives the transferee a right of appeal to the National Company Law Tribunal, within thirty days of the notice of refusal in a private company, or within the periods stated in sub-section (4) for a public company. That is the statutory answer to a board that stonewalls a completed drag.
Indicative timelines and costs
| Step | Indicative timeline | Indicative cost drivers |
|---|---|---|
| Negotiating drag and tag in a term sheet and shareholders agreement | Two to six weeks alongside the rest of the round | Legal fees, which vary with deal size and are not regulated |
| Amending articles to mirror the agreement | Board meeting plus a general meeting on notice, then filing with the Registrar | Filing fees on the basis of authorised capital, plus professional certification |
| Running a drag to completion in a clean deal | Roughly six to twelve weeks from drag notice to closing | Valuation, stamp duty on transfer, escrow agent charges |
| Section 236 squeeze-out at ninety per cent | Several months, driven by registered valuer report and the deposit and disbursement mechanics | Registered valuer fees and the cost of funding the separate bank account |
| Contested proceedings before the NCLT | Highly variable and usually measured in years, not months | Counsel, valuation evidence, and the commercial cost of a frozen cap table |
Stamp duty on a transfer of shares is an ad valorem charge under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended, collected through the depository where the shares are dematerialised. Rates and collection mechanics have changed in recent years, so the rate should be confirmed at the time of closing rather than assumed from an earlier deal.
Deadline warning. Drag notices almost always carry a short compliance window, commonly ten to twenty business days. If you receive one and think it is defective, take advice inside that window. Signing under protest with a recorded reservation is usually a better position than missing the deadline and litigating afterwards.
A practitioner's note
The pattern in disputes is monotonous. The shareholders agreement contains an elegant drag clause. The articles were never amended, or were amended with a truncated version drafted by whoever filed the forms. Years later the buyer's counsel reads the articles, finds no drag, and the whole transaction turns on whether a minority holder with four per cent will sign. At that point the four per cent holder has all the leverage and knows it. The remedy costs nothing at the time of investment: mirror the clause in the articles, keep the power of attorney with the company secretary, and re-check the articles after every round, because each new class of shares tends to overwrite the transfer provisions. The second recurring problem is the drag with no price floor and no liability cap. Those two numbers are worth more argument at signing than the drag percentage itself. For the wider document set, see our notes on key clauses in a shareholders agreement and on the term sheet in a funding round, and if the relationship has already broken down, on oppression and mismanagement before the NCLT. Our corporate and commercial practice page sets out how these matters are usually sequenced.
Related guides and where to get help
- Share Valuation in NCLT Buy-Out Orders: How Fair Value Is Fixed When a Minority Shareholder Exits
- Married Daughter & Compassionate Appointment Rights
- Wrongful Termination in India: Employee Rights and Remedies (2026)
Frequently Asked Questions
Are drag-along and tag-along rights legally valid in India?
Yes. The SEBI notification dated 3 October 2013 issued under Sections 16 and 28 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 expressly permits contracts for pre-emption, right of first refusal, tag-along and drag-along rights in shareholders agreements and articles of association, and the proviso to Section 58(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 makes contracts between shareholders about transfer of securities enforceable as contracts.
Do these clauses have to be in the articles of association?
For practical enforceability, yes. V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan holds that a transfer restriction agreed among shareholders but absent from the articles binds neither the company nor the shareholders. The agreement can still be enforced between the parties who signed it, but the company is not obliged to give effect to it.
Can a drag be exercised against a founder?
Only if the founder agreed to it. Founders commonly negotiate a lock-in period during which no drag may be exercised, a higher trigger threshold, and a floor price below which the drag cannot operate.
What is the difference between a right of first refusal and a right of first offer?
Under a right of first refusal, the seller must first find a third party price and then offer the shares to the existing holders on those terms. Under a right of first offer, the seller must invite a price from the existing holders before approaching the market. The second is friendlier to a seller because it does not require a third party to be dragged through a process that may be pre-empted.
Can the minority challenge a drag as oppressive?
A minority shareholder can approach the National Company Law Tribunal under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 where the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to its interests. Whether a drag exercised strictly in accordance with an agreed clause can be characterised that way depends heavily on the price, the parity of terms and the conduct of the majority.
What happens if a dragged shareholder simply refuses to sign?
The agreement should contain a self-executing mechanic, typically an irrevocable power of attorney or a deemed transfer provision recorded in the articles, so that closing does not depend on cooperation. Without such a mechanic, the majority is left with a suit for specific performance, which rarely fits a deal timetable.
Does an acquirer who reaches ninety per cent still need a contractual drag?
Not necessarily. Section 236 of the Companies Act, 2013 allows an acquirer holding ninety per cent or more of the issued equity share capital to notify the company and offer to buy the remaining shares at a registered valuer's price, with the consideration deposited in a separate account. It is slower and more formal than a contractual drag, but it does not depend on the minority having signed anything.
Do the same rules apply to foreign investors?
The contractual rights are the same, but the SEBI notification requires compliance with the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. Exit pricing for a non-resident is regulated, and clauses promising an assured return on exit are the usual casualty.
This article is general information as at the date of publication and is not legal advice. Transaction documents turn on their own wording and on the regulatory position at the time, and specific matters should be taken up on their own facts.






