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Arbitration & ADR

The Other Side May Hide Assets Before Your Arbitration Ends: Will the DIFC Courts Freeze Them or Stop a Share Transfer?

By Advocate Sharan Jain November 21, 2026

The Other Side May Hide Assets Before Your Arbitration Ends: Will the DIFC Courts Freeze Them or Stop a Share Transfer?

They can, but only where the application has a jurisdictional foundation and, for a freezing order, the evidence shows a real risk that assets will be dissipated, not merely sold. In CFI 111/2025, order with reasons of 23 March 2026, the DIFC Court of First Instance continued a stop order over shares in a DIFC-registered company until the LCIA tribunal decides whether the sellers can have them back, and in the same claim refused a worldwide freezing order because the feared sale was a public auction whose proceeds would go to the respondent itself. In ARB 007/2026, reasons of 30 January 2026, a worldwide freezing order for a Paris-seated arbitration was refused for want of jurisdiction because no asset or nexus in the DIFC was identified, and in Orlagh v Orchid [2026] DIFC CA 001, judgment of 4 May 2026, the Court of Appeal said that decision should not be followed on jurisdiction.

This guide is for a party to an arbitration, seated anywhere, who wants the Court's own measure against the other side. It does not cover the different route by which a party asks the Court, under Article 24(2) of the Arbitration Law, to enforce an interim measure the tribunal itself has ordered, and it does not restate the general freezing-order tests, which the guide on a debtor moving assets before judgment covers.

The grid sets out the five decisions this guide draws on, from 2024 to 2026, by seat, DIFC nexus and stage of the arbitration.

DecisionSeatAsset or nexus in the DIFCTribunal constituted when the Court actedRelief granted or refused
ARB 006/2024, orders of 4 April and 22 May 2024 and permission orders of 2024Clause said only "Dubai Arbitration". Held more likely a DIFC seatThe DIFC seat itselfNo. DIAC request filed by the return hearingWorldwide freezing order and asset disclosure granted without notice and continued. Permission to appeal on one seat question, no appeal judgment published
CFI 111/2025, stop order of 5 December 2025, reasons of 23 March 2026DIFC, LCIA RulesShares in a DIFC-registered companyNo in December 2025. Yes at the March 2026 hearingStop order continued until the tribunal decides. Worldwide freezing order and disclosure refused: no real risk of dissipation
ARB 007/2026, reasons of 30 January 2026Paris, arbitration not commencedNone identifiedNoWorldwide freezing order and disclosure refused for want of jurisdiction under Article 15(4). Disapproved on that point in CA 001/2026
ARB 023/2026, ruling of 24 April 2026Not statedNot statedNot statedOrder made without notice. ARB 007/2026 not cited, but no action taken because under Trafigura it should not be followed
ARB 024/2025, freezing order of 21 July 2025, permission to appeal of 24 March 2026SIAC award already made. Seat disputed, treated as onshore Dubai in the 7 August 2025 orderNeither party connected to the DIFCNot applicable: in aid of enforcing the awardWorldwide freezing order granted, then discharged after the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal's decision. Permission to appeal on every ground, appeal pending

Which law lets the DIFC Courts protect an arbitration, and does the seat matter?

Two instruments read together, and the seat decides the gateway rather than the power. Article 15 of the DIFC Arbitration Law, DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008 in its December 2013 consolidation, provides that "it is not incompatible with an Arbitration Agreement for a party to request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a Court an interim measure of protection and for a Court to grant such measure." Article 7(2) extends Article 15 to arbitrations seated outside the DIFC.

Jurisdiction now rests on Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025, whose Article 43(A) superseded the 2004 laws. Article 14(A)(6) covers claims arising from an arbitration seated in the DIFC, or where the parties agree to the DIFC Courts' jurisdiction. Article 15 gives jurisdiction over interim or precautionary measures related to claims within the Courts' jurisdiction and, in Article 15(4), to "applications, claims, or current or future arbitral proceedings brought outside the DIFC seeking suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC." A DIFC seat enters through Article 14(A)(6) and 15(1). Any other seat enters through Article 15(4).

The powers sit in Part 25 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts: Rule 25.1(6) defines a freezing order as one restraining dealing with assets whether located within the jurisdiction or not, Rule 25.1(7) adds an order for information about assets and Rule 25.6 allows the order before proceedings start. ARB 006/2024 was decided under the 2004 Judicial Authority Law, every 2025 and 2026 decision under the 2025 Law. The DIFC Authority's Consultation Paper No. 2 of June 2026 proposes amendments but says they are draft only and not to be relied on until enacted, and at the time of writing none is listed as enacted, so Article 15 stands as quoted.

What did the Court decide in CFI 111/2025, the stop order over shares in a DIFC company?

It kept the stop order until the tribunal rules. The claimants had sold their shares in a DIFC-registered company under a share purchase agreement of 24 May 2024, for loan notes and a promised exchange of shares in the buyer that never took place. On 27 November 2025 the sellers issued a Part 8 claim form with an urgent application, and on 5 December 2025 the Court made a stop order without notice prohibiting the buyer from registering any transfer of its shares in the company.

The rule is the stop order provision in Part 46 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts, available "on the application of any person claiming to be beneficially entitled to an interest in the securities". The judge stressed the words "claiming to be": the applicant need not establish the entitlement in law or fact. The ordinary interim-injunction test then applied: a good arguable case, inadequacy of damages and the balance of convenience.

The buyer argued that the sellers' remedy was contractual only and that no proprietary claim could arise. The judge declined to decide that, because it might trespass on matters for the tribunal, and maintained the order until the tribunal determines whether a proprietary claim is sustainable. Damages would be inadequate if the buyer proved insolvent, because a proprietary interest survives an insolvency where a damages claim takes a dividend. The buyer's offered undertaking not to dispose of the shares was declined: it would bind only the buyer, while the stop order binds the DIFC company and a notice party too. The order runs until the tribunal decides, and the Court's assistance will be needed afterwards to vary or discharge it or to enforce any transfer on the DIFC Registrar of Companies.

Why did the same Court refuse the worldwide freezing order?

Because no real risk of dissipation was shown, although a good arguable case in contract was conceded. The sellers said the buyer's sale of four subsidiaries would dissipate assets and leave any award unenforceable. The judge observed that, without a specific prohibition on sales, a freezing order would not stop a legitimate business sale.

The evidence was that the buyer's assets had been seized under a criminal court order abroad, that a state fund had been appointed trustee, that the subsidiaries had been found financially unsustainable, and that a public auction announced on 20 January 2026 and held on 4 March 2026 had produced a bid from an independent third party above the reserve price. The proceeds would go to the buyer alone, and its counsel gave an undertaking to the Court to that effect. The sellers' attack on the integrity of the trusteeship, resting on two published articles, failed for want of clear and cogent evidence: suspicion and concern as to risk is not enough.

The claim was for approximately USD 16.376 million plus interest and costs. The proceeds were plainly sufficient, but the judge inferred a real risk that the buyer's liabilities may exceed its assets. That is an insolvency risk, not a dissipation risk. The freezing order was refused, and with it the disclosure of assets that would have been ancillary to it.

Key takeaway. A freezing order answers the risk that assets will be moved beyond reach. It does not answer the risk that an honest sale, with the proceeds paid to the respondent, will leave a respondent whose debts exceed its assets. For that risk the sellers' protection was the stop order over the specific shares they claimed, not a general freeze.

The seat is abroad and the respondent has nothing in the DIFC: can you still apply?

Yes, but expect the Court to ask what a DIFC order will achieve. In ARB 007/2026 a UAE company sought a worldwide freezing order up to about USD 8.07 million and worldwide asset disclosure against an entity registered outside the DIFC under an asset management agreement with a Paris-seated arbitration clause. The arbitration had not been commenced, neither party was a DIFC entity, and the only UAE asset identified was an onshore Dubai bank account. The judge held that jurisdiction is anterior and cannot be left to the return date, that "within the DIFC" is not surplusage, that an order regulating assets wholly outside the DIFC with no identified nexus did not meet the gateway, and that a disclosure order cannot operate as a substitute gateway.

In ARB 023/2026, ruling of 24 April 2026, a different judge had made an order on a without-notice application for a worldwide freezing order on 8 April 2026, and learned afterwards that ARB 007/2026 had not been cited. He accepted that the omission was inadvertent, though not blameless, and took no action, because in light of the Court of Appeal's decision in Trafigura, ARB 007/2026 "should not be followed as long as Trafigura remains authoritative."

In Orlagh v Orchid, judgment of 4 May 2026, an appeal about a Dubai Courts judgment debtor decided on other grounds, the Court of Appeal dealt with ARB 007/2026 at paragraphs 73 to 79. The judge "went further than was necessary in an ex parte proceeding to hold that there was no jurisdiction." The decision "cannot however be taken as authority for the proposition that neither jurisdiction nor power to make disclosure orders exists unless the existence of assets within the DIFC has first been established, and should not be followed in this regard."

What survives of ARB 007/2026 is its list of discretionary objections, each of which the Court of Appeal said may still justify refusing relief without notice. For a judgment creditor, the guide on a judgment debtor who moved assets to family members covers the same Article 15(4) question.

What did the Court of Appeal decide in Trafigura about Article 15(4)?

That the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to grant freezing and disclosure orders in aid of proceedings outside the DIFC whose outcome could be enforced there, and that Article 15(4) confers it in terms. Trafigura [2025] DIFC CA 001, judgment of 22 September 2025, concerned a freezing order in support of claims pending in the English High Court against respondents resident in onshore Dubai. At paragraphs 128 to 138 the Court of Appeal held that a freezing order sought in aid of an enforcement jurisdiction needs no separate head of jurisdiction, and that in any event Article 15(4), read with the opening words of Article 15, "expressly confers the jurisdiction which authorises the exercise of the measures referred to in Article (15)4". The jurisdiction extends to disclosure of assets and information relevant to the foreign proceedings and to enforcement "whether in the DIFC or in the foreign jurisdiction". Forum shopping was called misconceived and in any event a matter of discretion. Article 15(4) names "current or future arbitral proceedings brought outside the DIFC" in the same words, and Orlagh v Orchid relied on Trafigura when disapproving ARB 007/2026, an arbitration case.

What must your evidence prove, and how does a stop order differ from a freezing order?

For a freezing order, the four matters the Court listed in ARB 007/2026 from Part 25 and the established jurisprudence applying English law principles: a good arguable case, assets capable of enforcement, a real risk of dissipation, and that it is just and convenient to grant the relief. For a stop order the applicant must claim a beneficial entitlement to an interest in the securities, and the Court applies the interim-injunction test. A freezing order fails where the dealings are honest. A stop order does not depend on dissipation at all.

The cards set out the four measures the decisions describe.

Freezing order

Restrains dealing with assets within or outside the jurisdiction under Rule 25.1(6). Requires a real risk of dissipation, which a public auction with proceeds paid to the respondent did not show in CFI 111/2025.

Stop order over shares

Under Part 46, stops registration of a transfer or payment of dividends on specified securities. Open to anyone claiming a beneficial interest in them, and binds the company and third parties as well.

Asset disclosure

Rule 25.1(7). Ordinarily ancillary to a freezing order, so refused in CFI 111/2025 when the freezing order fell. ARB 007/2026's narrow view of jurisdiction to order it was disapproved by the Court of Appeal.

Proprietary injunction

Sought in CFI 111/2025 but not pursued over the four subsidiaries. Whether the sellers had a proprietary claim to the shares at all was left to the tribunal, so the Court held the ring instead.

Do you need the tribunal's permission once it is constituted, and will the Court defer to it?

Check your institutional rules, and expect the Court to protect the arbitral process rather than compete with it. In CFI 111/2025 the LCIA Rules required, in certain circumstances, the tribunal's authorisation before a party sought injunctive relief from a court after the tribunal's constitution. The sellers applied to the tribunal on 27 February 2026, and on 11 March 2026 it issued Procedural Order No. 1 holding that permission was not needed for a freezing injunction under Article 25.3 of those Rules, and refusing the buyer's application for an anti-suit order against the court application.

The tribunal, still seized of a parallel application, asked the parties how duplication would be avoided. The judge refused to decide the proprietary argument the tribunal would have to determine, said nothing in his reasons was intended to cut across the tribunal, and described his task as holding the ring in support of the arbitral process. A party who holds the tribunal's own interim measure and wants it enforced under Article 24(2) of the Arbitration Law is on a different route from the one described here.

Your clause says only Dubai arbitration: is the seat the DIFC, and does it matter for the order?

It may be, and it governs the gateway you use. In ARB 006/2024 a commodities trader had paid USD 230,228,799 under a sales contract of 29 November 2023 for six million barrels of crude oil, purported to terminate the contract on 28 March 2024 and demanded repayment. Clause 13 said the agreement "shall be governed by and construed in accordance with English law, Dubai Arbitration". The freezing and disclosure orders made without notice on 4 April 2024 in aid of a prospective DIAC arbitration were continued on 22 May 2024 over a jurisdiction challenge, with reasons published on 2 July 2024.

The judge held that "Dubai Arbitration" did not, in that contract, stipulate a DIAC institutional arbitration, but that the words could mean either a DIFC or an onshore Dubai seat for an ad hoc arbitration, and that no general rule makes "Dubai" mean onshore Dubai in every case. Weighing the choice of English law, the international character of the parties and subject matter, and evidence of the applicant's belief, he found the DIFC more likely intended.

In the order of 31 July 2024 the judge found no realistic prospect of success on any ground, but granted permission to appeal on one issue, for the compelling reason that the Court of Appeal should give guidance on whether in an ad hoc arbitration the words "Dubai Arbitration" can constitute a choice of a DIFC or a non-DIFC seat. At the time of writing the published lists carry three decisions in the claim, the last being the Court of Appeal's refusal of renewed permission on 9 October 2024, and no judgment on the seat appeal. It remains a first-instance finding.

Deadline warning. A stop order stops the registration of a transfer. It does not undo one already registered. In CFI 111/2025 the order came eight days after the claim form and before the arbitration had been commenced. If a transfer or sale is imminent, apply before it completes: Rule 46.35(2) allows a Part 8 claim form where no proceedings exist, and Article 15 of the Arbitration Law allows it before the arbitral proceedings begin.

Can the other side get your order discharged for non-disclosure at the without-notice hearing?

Yes, if it shows that the Court was misled in a material respect. The ruling of 24 April 2026 in ARB 023/2026 adopts the description of the duty of full and frank disclosure as a high duty of the first importance. The usual result of a breach, it warns, is discharge without regrant, or discharge and regrant with an adverse costs order for the hearing concerned.

In the Court of Appeal's order of 9 October 2024 in ARB 006/2024, renewed permission to appeal on this ground was refused with costs. An allegation that legal argument was not disclosed is tantamount to an allegation of professional misconduct and must be particularised, the first-instance judge had twice stated that he knew the authorities said to have been omitted, so the Court was not misled, and even where a breach is found the Court may re-order the injunction at once on the evidence before it. In CFI 111/2025 the judge accepted that more should have been said at the first hearing, but held that the Court was not misled and the failures were not serious enough to set the stop order aside.

Common mistake. Presenting the respondent's known position as agreed, or leaving out the authority that cuts against you. In CFI 111/2025 the skeleton said the buyer accepted that the contract had been frustrated, and counsel could not sustain that at the hearing. The order survived because the judge had seen the room for argument himself.

The other side goes to the Dubai Courts or the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal: what happens to your freezing order?

Nothing automatic, on the DIFC decisions, but ARB 024/2025 shows how far a jurisdictional conflict can reach. The applicant held a SIAC award of June 2025, a DIFC recognition order of 9 July 2025 and a worldwide freezing order of 21 July 2025 in support of enforcement. The respondent, which had also sued in the Dubai Courts to annul the award, filed a conflict application with the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal, registered as Application No. 2 of 2025 on 31 July 2025, and sought a stay. In the order of 7 August 2025 the judge held that Article 7 of Decree No. (29) of 2024 does not stay DIFC proceedings on the mere registration of a conflict claim: read with Article 6, a stay follows only once the Tribunal's authority over the application is established and a genuine conflict identified. The respondent was ordered to keep complying with the freezing order. A further urgent stay application was dismissed by the order of 28 August 2025 as misusing Part 25, which governs interim remedies, not stays.

The Tribunal decided Application No. 2 of 2025 on 2 September 2025. Its orders, as the DIFC Court of Appeal later set them out, were that the Dubai Courts have jurisdiction over the annulment case, that the DIFC Courts lack jurisdiction over the ratification and enforcement claim and must suspend enforcement of the award, and that the dispute over the freezing order was inadmissible in form, no conflict of jurisdiction having been proven in respect of it. On 23 September 2025 the first-instance judge dismissed the claim, discharged the freezing order with immediate effect and dismissed every pending application, apparently without inviting submissions, and without reasons, and refused permission to appeal on 14 January 2026.

In the order of 24 March 2026 the Chief Justice granted renewed permission to appeal on all three grounds. His provisional views were that the Tribunal had arguably declined to suspend the freezing order in the face of an explicit request, that Court of Appeal authority establishes a freestanding jurisdiction to grant freezing orders in support of enforcing foreign awards and judgments, not dependent on a pending recognition application, and that, where jurisdiction is reasonably arguable, the judge should hear argument before discharging. At the time of writing no Court of Appeal judgment in the claim has been published and the Tribunal's own list shows no later decision concerning it.

The Court of Appeal in Orlagh v Orchid, at paragraphs 60 to 71, read the 2 September 2025 decision as a finding that the Dubai Courts were the most suitable court on those facts rather than a rule defining jurisdiction. The ARB 024/2025 order was made after the award, the stage the guide on challenging a DIFC recognition order covers.

What does a DIFC order add that a tribunal's measure cannot, and what will it not do?

It reaches people who never signed the arbitration agreement, and it carries the Court's own sanctions. The CFI 111/2025 order opens with a penal notice: a respondent who disobeys may be held in contempt and referred to the Attorney General of Dubai, fined or have assets seized.

The cards restate the limits the decisions set.

Binds non-parties

A tribunal's interim measure binds the parties to the arbitration. The stop order in CFI 111/2025 bound the DIFC company and a notice party as well, so the Court preferred it to an undertaking.

No block on honest sales

Without a specific prohibition, a freezing order does not stop a sale made as a legitimate business decision. The four-subsidiary auction went ahead with an undertaking that the proceeds reach the respondent.

Jurisdiction can be removed

In ARB 024/2025 the freezing order was discharged after the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal ruled on the main claim. Whether that discharge was right is before the Court of Appeal.

Court returns after the award

The stop order runs until the tribunal decides the restitution claim. The Court will then be asked to vary or discharge it, or to enforce any share transfer on the Registrar of Companies.

How should the application be prepared?

The order of work follows the questions the judges asked.

  1. Fix the seat. A DIFC seat enters through Article 14(A)(6) and 15(1) of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025, any other seat through Article 15(4), where your evidence must say what precautionary measure within the DIFC you seek.
  2. Identify every asset, account, shareholding and connection to the DIFC you can prove, with documents. For property abroad, produce title evidence rather than belief.
  3. Choose the measure. A claim to specific shares in a DIFC company points to a stop order under Part 46. A money claim at risk from dissipation points to a freezing order under Rule 25.1(6), with disclosure under Rule 25.1(7).
  4. Prove dissipation, not sale. Concealment, less than candid answers about disposals, or transfers to connected parties are what the test looks for.
  5. Check the institutional rules for any permission requirement once the tribunal is constituted, and record what the tribunal has been asked for.
  6. Start by Arbitration Claim Form under Part 43, or Part 8 claim form for a stop order, and put the Registrar on notice first if urgent.
  7. Prepare the without-notice evidence as if the respondent were in the room, including the authorities against you and the reasons notice is not given, as Rule 25.10 requires.
  8. Offer the undertaking in damages and be ready to secure it. The guide on recovering losses after a discharged freezing order shows what it can cost.
  9. If the respondent files a conflict application with the Tribunal, oppose any stay on the Article 6 and Article 7 analysis in the order of 7 August 2025 and ask that the freezing order continue pending any decision.

Where do applicants in this position go wrong?

On these decisions, the costly errors are made in choosing the measure and in framing the risk. A party whose real complaint is that it will be an unsecured creditor of an insolvent respondent asks for a freezing order, which cannot answer insolvency, when the claim it should protect is to the specific asset it transferred. A party with a foreign seat and no DIFC asset argues jurisdiction at length, which after Orlagh v Orchid is the easier half, and says nothing about why a DIFC order is a suitable precautionary measure here, which is the half the judge will decide against it. And a party that wins without notice treats the return date as a formality, when the discharge application will be built from everything the skeleton glossed over.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can the DIFC Courts freeze assets before my arbitration has even started? Yes. Article 15 of the DIFC Arbitration Law allows a party to request an interim measure of protection from a court before or during arbitral proceedings, and Rules 25.6 and 25.7 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts allow an interim remedy before a claim is made if the matter is urgent or it is otherwise desirable in the interests of justice. In CFI 111/2025 the stop order was made on 5 December 2025 and the LCIA request was filed on 15 December 2025. In ARB 006/2024 the freezing order was made on 4 April 2024 in aid of a prospective DIAC arbitration whose request was filed by the return hearing. In ARB 007/2026, where only a draft request existed, the judge accepted that Article 15(4) speaks of future arbitral proceedings but refused the order on other grounds.

The arbitration is seated in Paris or Singapore. Does the DIFC Court have jurisdiction at all? Yes, under Article 15(4) of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025, which covers applications, claims or current or future arbitral proceedings brought outside the DIFC seeking suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC. The Court of Appeal in Trafigura held that Article 15(4) expressly confers the jurisdiction, and in Orlagh v Orchid it said the first-instance decision in ARB 007/2026, which had refused jurisdiction because no DIFC asset was identified, should not be followed on that point. Whether the Court exercises the jurisdiction is a matter of discretion, and the absence of any identified asset or nexus remains a ground on which relief may be refused.

What is a stop order, and when is it better than a freezing order? A stop order under Part 46 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts prohibits the registration of any transfer of specified securities, and may also stop dividends or other payments on them. It is available on the application of any person claiming to be beneficially entitled to an interest in the securities. It is better than a freezing order where your claim is to the shares themselves, because it does not depend on proving a risk of dissipation and it binds the company whose register is affected. In CFI 111/2025 the Court continued the stop order while refusing the freezing order at the same hearing.

The respondent is selling subsidiaries at auction. Is that dissipation? Not by itself. In CFI 111/2025 the judge held that a sale by public auction, conducted under a court-appointed trustee abroad, with the proceeds to be paid to the respondent to meet its debts and an undertaking to the Court to that effect, showed no risk of dissipation, and he added that a freezing order without a specific prohibition on sales would not stop a legitimate business sale in any event. The risk that the respondent's liabilities exceed its assets is an insolvency risk, which a freezing order does not address.

Do I need the tribunal's permission to go to the DIFC Court once the tribunal is constituted? It depends on your institutional rules. In CFI 111/2025 the LCIA tribunal issued a procedural order on 11 March 2026 holding that permission was not required under Article 25.3 of the LCIA Rules for an application for a freezing injunction, apparently because a court order binds banks and third parties where a tribunal's order does not. The tribunal also asked the parties to explain why relief from both forums was needed and how inconsistency would be avoided, and the judge said nothing in his decision was intended to cut across the tribunal.

Our clause says the arbitration is a Dubai arbitration. Is that a DIFC seat? It can be. In ARB 006/2024 the Court held that the words "Dubai Arbitration" in an English law contract did not create a DIAC institutional arbitration but could mean either a DIFC or an onshore Dubai seat for an ad hoc arbitration, and found on the contextual factors that the DIFC was more likely intended. That is a first-instance finding on which permission to appeal was granted for the Court of Appeal's guidance, and no appeal judgment had been published at the time of writing. Your own clause will be construed in its own context.

The other side has filed a conflict application with the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Tribunal. Is my freezing order suspended? Not automatically, on the DIFC decisions. In ARB 024/2025 the judge held on 7 August 2025 that Article 7 of Decree No. (29) of 2024 stays proceedings only once the Tribunal's authority over the application is established and a genuine conflict is identified, and ordered the respondent to keep complying with the freezing order. After the Tribunal ruled on 2 September 2025 that the DIFC Courts lacked jurisdiction over the main enforcement claim, the first-instance judge discharged the order, apparently without a hearing, and the Court of Appeal granted permission to appeal on 24 March 2026, observing provisionally that the Tribunal had arguably declined to suspend the freezing order itself. That appeal was pending at the time of writing.

Can the respondent have the order set aside because my lawyers did not cite a case against us? Only if the omission misled the Court in a material respect. In ARB 023/2026 the failure to cite ARB 007/2026 was inadvertent and would have changed nothing, so no action was taken, with a warning that the usual consequence of a breach is discharge, or discharge and regrant with adverse costs. In ARB 006/2024 the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal on this ground because the allegation was unparticularised, the judge had said he knew the authorities, and a judge who finds a breach may re-order the injunction at once on the evidence before the Court.

This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice on your specific situation.

References

Matters before the DIFC Courts are conducted by the firm, with counsel from its panel of DIFC-registered advocates engaged for the hearing. The firm acts as counsel in arbitrations seated in the DIFC and the wider UAE, and conducts the Indian proceedings that follow, including enforcement of UAE awards and judgments in India. This section is legal information, not legal advice.

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